INTRODUCTION
With Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia 1 the European Court of Human Rights (the ECtHR or the Court) joined the 'fi ght' and the legal debate as to how the 'fi ght' should be fought against human traffi cking. Th e fi nal pronouncements by the ECtHR in this case which condemned both Cyprus and Russia for human rights violations have been very positively endorsed. 2 Th e endorsement has been so positive that the road taken by the Court for reaching its conclusions has escaped a critical gaze. But for Jean Allain, no one has off ered critical comments on the case. 3 Th e objective of this article is to point to four problems which permeate the ECtHR's legal analysis on Article 4 of the ECHR. Th e fi rst question raised is on what basis the Court concluded that the case of Oxana Rantseva is one of human traffi cking. In relation to this question, it is suggested that not only the analysis of the factual circumstances is contestable, but also the legal analysis on Article 4 is fl awed. In the section "Dancing across Borders", an argument is developed that framing the case as one of human traffi cking implicates the Court in anti-immigration and anti-prostitution agenda. Most importantly, the article submits that the Court should discard the human traffi cking framework and should focus on the actual abuses prohibited under Article 4. For the purposes of the last submission, an examination of the relationship between, from the one hand, human traffi cking and, from the other hand, slavery, servitude and forced labour, is necessary. It is advanced how Article 4 should be progressively interpreted without resort to the human traffi cking framework and how the Court should have made use of the concept of slavery. Lastly, the article questions whether the ECtHR off ered a persuasive legal analysis as to States' positive obligations under Article 4 of taking protective operation measures.
Th e critique of the ECtHR's legal reasoning should not be mistaken as a denial of the abuses and suff ering which many migrant women and specifi cally women working as artistes and/or prostitutes in Cyprus go through. On the contrary, the issue which this article is intended to put forward is whether the adopted reasoning and the human traffi cking framework are the right mechanism to address those abuses. It has to be also pre-emptively clarifi ed that whereas the Court's reasoning on 
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Article 4 is challenged, the ultimate reaffi rmation of States' positive obligations under Article 4 of the ECtHR is viewed as favourable. 4 Before immersing into detailed formal legal analysis, the factual circumstances in Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia have to be briefl y described. Miss Oxana Rantseva left Russia and entered Cyprus on an artiste visa to work as an artiste in a cabaret. Under the Cypriot legislation an artiste is 'any alien who wishes to enter Cyprus in order to work in a cabaret, musical-dancing place or other night entertainment place and has attained the age of 18 years'. 5 She left her place of employment three days aft er starting. Th e manager of the cabaret found her in a discotheque and took her to the police asking the police to declare her as illegal in the country, supposedly in view of her being deported. 6 Th e police concluded that Rantseva was not illegal. Instead of releasing her, the police called the manager and asked him to come and collect her from the police station. Rantseva was taken by the cabaret manager to the apartment of another employee, where she was taken to a room on the sixth fl oor. In the morning of the following day, Rantseva was found dead in the street below the apartment's balcony. A bedspread was found looped through the railing of the apartment's balcony. Based on a complaint by Rantseva's father to the ECtHR, the Court found violations of Article 2 (right to life), Article 4 (prohibition on slavery, servitude and forced labour) and Article 5 (right to liberty and security) of the ECHR. Under Article 2, Cyprus was found responsible for its failure to fulfi l its positive obligation to carry on an eff ective investigation into Rantseva's death. 7 Th e ECtHR found that Rantseva's detention at the police station and her subsequent confi nement to the private apartment to which confi nement the state authorities acquiesced, amounted to deprivation of liberty. Cyprus was declared to be in violation of Article 5 since the deprivation of liberty had no basis in the domestic law. 8 As already mentioned, it is the factual and legal analysis concerning Article 4 which is henceforth an object of detailed investigation.
A CASE OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING?
Th e ECtHR has developed a methodology that it follows when there is an allegation of a violation of a Convention right. It discusses the general material scope of the right 4 However, even the endorsement of the affi rmation of states' positive obligations under Article 4 has to be qualifi ed due to the ECtHR's pronouncements on the artiste visa regime. Th e section 'Dancing across Borders' clarifi es this position in more detail.
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Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, at para. 113. 6 Pursuant to the artiste regime established in Cyprus, the number of artistes who could be employed in a single cabaret is limited (Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, at para. 116). If an artiste failed to come to work or breached her contract, she would be deported and the expenses would be covered by the bank guarantee which the cabaret manager was required to deposit in advance (Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, at para. 117).
Intersentia invoked and it asks the question whether the particular circumstances of the case fall within the already delineated material scope. If they do, the ECtHR proceeds by indicating the human rights obligations impinged upon the State in connection with the particular provision from the ECHR invoked. For the purpose of achieving more clarity, concrete examples touching upon diff erent articles enshrining diff erent human rights protected under the ECHR, will be provided. In M.S.S. v. Belgium and France, 9 the Court faced the question whether the scope of Article 3 was engaged by a situation of extreme material poverty. More specifi cally, the issue was whether the material scope of Article 3, which prohibits torture or inhuman or degrading treatment, covers extreme material poverty. Aft er an answer in the affi rmative, the ECtHR diligently reviewed the factual circumstances in the particular case related to extreme material poverty and concluded that the applicant's situation of material deprivation 'has attained the level of severity required to fall within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention'. 10 In Siliadin v. France, it was necessary for the ECtHR to determine whether Article 4's material scope covers harm infl icted by private parties and, thus, whether States have any positive obligations fl owing from Article 4. 11 Th e Court gave a positive answer to that question and then examined whether, in particular, the harm infl icted by private parties on Siliadin qualifi ed as slavery, servitude or forced labour. In Storck v. Germany, the Court fi rst asked the question whether there had been a deprivation of liberty under Article 5; in other words, whether the factual situation of the applicant could be assessed as one of deprivation of liberty in order to fall within the material scope of Article 5. 12 Th e approach to Article 8, which protects private and family life, is similar. Th e Court fi rst asks the question of what is 'private life' and/ or what is 'family life'. For instance, when examining whether there was interference with Article 8's rights in deportation cases, the Court had to consider whether 'family life' extended to include dependence between parents and adult children. 13 Th e relevant issue here is whether the ECtHR applied an identical approach in the Rantsev case. More specifi cally, the following questions are of interest: did the Court explain the material scope of Article 4? Once having determined Article 4's material scope, did the Court actually explain how the particular factual circumstances of the case correlated to and/or fi tted into the already delineated scope? As will On their face, the facts describing the story of the Russian woman did not indicate that she was, indeed, subjected to abuses that could be qualifi ed as slavery, servitude or forced labour. Bar her deprivation of liberty at the police station and at the private apartment and her subsequent death under undetermined circumstances, there was nothing pointing to abuses against her. Th e ECtHR itself stated in the section of the judgment on Article 3, which article was also raised by the applicant, that '[…] there is no evidence that Ms Rantseva was subjected to ill-treatment prior to her death'. 14 Consequently, the question of signifi cance here is how Article 4 and the prohibition on slavery, servitude and forced labour came into the picture in light of the facts of the case. Th ey came into the picture because of the allegation that Rantseva was a victim of human traffi cking: '[…] in the absence of any specifi c allegations of ill-treatment, any inhuman or degrading treatment suff ered by Ms Rantseva prior to her death was inherently linked to the alleged traffi cking and exploitation'. 15 Th ere seem to be two bases for this allegation: fi rst, she entered Cyprus to work as an artiste, and second, there were reports on the situation of artistes in Cyprus claiming that artistes worked as prostitutes and were, thus, victims of exploitation. Th ere were some additional factual circumstances which might point to abuses and which might fi t into the general perceptions as to how victims of traffi cking are treated. First, the second autopsy of the Rantseva's body carried out in Russia showed that she might have sustained injury or she might have been killed before falling down from the balcony. Th is factual circumstance was situated within the analysis of the right to life and the obligations incumbent on Cyprus to conduct an eff ective investigation into the death. 16 Second, when Rantseva and her employer went to the police station, the employer had her passport, which seemed to be linked with the general information that victims of human traffi cking are deprived of their identifi cation documents. However, is this fact a suffi cient indication that she was a victim of exploitation and/ or human traffi cking? Th ird, it was hard to explain why the policemen did not let Rantseva go free by herself, but called her employer to pick her up. Th is behaviour on the part of the Cypriot policemen could imply that there might have been cooperation between the policemen and the cabaret owner since if she were to be deported, the deportation expenses would have to be covered by the employer. Such cooperation might be interpreted as indications of corruption in the Cypriot police department. However, this factual circumstance seems related to Article 5 and the right to liberty. Ultimately, as explained above, an assertion that Rantseva's story has anything to do with human traffi cking is substantiated on two bases: she entered Cyprus to work as […] Th ere is obviously a risk that the young women who enter Cyprus on artiste visas may be victims of traffi cking in human beings or later become victims of abuse or coercion. Th ese women are offi cially recruited as cabaret dancers but are nevertheless oft en expected also to work as prostitutes. Th ey are usually from countries with inferior income levels to those in Cyprus and may fi nd themselves in a vulnerable position to refuse demands from their employers or clients. Th e system itself, whereby the establishment owner applies for the permit on behalf of the woman, oft en renders the woman dependent on her employer or agent, and increases the risk of her falling into the hands of traffi cking networks. 19 Th e Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights' report issued in 2008 concludes:
A paradox certainly exists that while the Cypriot government has made legislative eff orts to fi ght traffi cking in human beings […] , it continues to issue work permits for so-called cabaret artistes and licences for the cabaret establishment.
[…] Th e existence of the 'artiste' work permit leads to a situation which makes it very diffi cult for law enforcement authorities to prove coercion and traffi cking and eff ectively combat it. Th is type of permit could thus be perceived as contradicting the measures taken against traffi cking or at least as rendering them ineff ective. For these reasons, the Commissioner regrets that the 'artiste' work permit is still in place today despite the fact that the government has previously expressed its commitment to abolish it. 20 Th ese reports provide the foundations for easily making the above mentioned assumptions: since Rantseva entered Cyprus to work as an artiste, she also might have been forced or deceived to work as a prostitute; if she had worked as a prostitute the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefi ts to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.
As it is generally explained, the crime of human traffi cking, as defi ned in the Palermo Protocol, consists of three elements: (1) action (recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons); (2) which must have been committed by certain means; (3) for the purpose of exploitation. 26 One might try to diligently search for a quotation of the defi nition of human traffi cking and an explanation of its constitutive elements in the Rantsev judgment. Th ese eff orts are doomed to fail. Th ere is neither a defi nition nor an explanation. 29 Instead, the ECtHR determined that […] traffi cking in human beings, by its very nature and aim of exploitation, is based on the exercise of powers attaching to the right of ownership. It treats human beings as commodities to be bought and sold and put to forced labor, oft en for little or no payment, usually in the sex industry but also elsewhere. 30 Th is statement begs the following comments. First, the statement appears as being not only legally uniformed, but also with moralistic nuances. It is disconnected from the existing legal defi nition of human traffi cking. It is also coloured with the reference to the 'sex industry'. Second, it is not true that human traffi cking, as defi ned in the Palermo Protocol, 'is based on the exercise of powers attaching to the right of ownership'. Slavery, which could be one of the purposes of human traffi cking, is defi ned as 'status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised'. 31 Th e Explanatory Report to the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Human Traffi cking specifi es in para. 88 that 'As regards "the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation", it should be noted that the Convention deal with these only in the context of traffi cking in human beings. Th e terms "exploitation of the prostitution of others" and "other forms of sexual exploitation" are not defi ned in the Convention, which is therefore without prejudice of how States Parties deal with prostitution in domestic law'. Th is means that there is no universal standard even within the Council of Europe's member states as to the approach to prostitution and as to the issue whether it is inherently exploitative. occasions, explained the defi nition of slavery. 32 Allain has also commented on Rantsev case and he has criticised the ECtHR for assimilating human traffi cking to slavery. 33 Th ird, and most importantly, the action element of the crime of human traffi cking as defi ned in the Palermo Protocol (recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons), refers to the arrangement and facilitation of the alleged victim's migration. It does not refer to the actual abuses and/or to the actual exercise of powers attaching to the right of ownership, which could imply selling, buying or bargaining of individuals. 34 Th e disconnection by the ECtHR from the existing legal defi nition of human traffi cking in the Palermo Protocol and the Anti-traffi cking Convention is so striking that one cannot but wonder whether there is anything beyond manifestation of inadvertence. Without foreclosing any other reasonable explanation, it could be suggested that the Court did not want to engage with the elements of the defi nition. It is much easier to simply refer in abstract to human traffi cking and exploitation, which the Court did throughout the whole judgment, than to explain what 'exploitation of the prostitution of others' is, whether Rantseva's prostitution was exploited, and whether her migration to Cyprus was organised with some of the means as indicated in the human traffi cking defi nition. Aft er all, the Palermo defi nition presupposes a discussion on these issues. It has to be clarifi ed that this article has no objective to argue that in principle the ECtHR has to discuss these issues. As it will emerge later, it adopts the position that the ECtHR does not need the human traffi cking framework and the defi nition of human traffi cking in order to address abuses. What it aims at this Hathaway has noted that there is no obligation fl owing from the Traffi cking Protocol to do anything about the conditions of being exploited. As the defi nition of human traffi cking is formulated, the 'action' element does not include the action of exploiting as such or maintaining an individual in a situation of exploitation. Accordingly, states adopt the obligation to criminalise 'recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons' by certain means for the purpose of 'exploitation'; however, there is no obligation to do something against exploitation of an individual who has not been recruited, transported, transferred or received. In addition, the defi nition of human traffi cking requires the adoption of certain 'means', which implies that not every 'recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons for the purpose of exploitation' is to be criminalised, but only such which have been executed through the 'means'. Anne Gallagher has opposed Hathaway's position by arguing that 'the references to harboring and receipt operate to bring not just the process (recruitment, transportation, transfer) but also the end situation of traffi cking within the defi nition. See Gallagher, A.T., Th e International Law of Human Traffi cking, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010, at pp. 30-31.
Intersentia juncture is pointing out that since the Court takes on board the Palermo defi nition, it can be expected that it actually engages with it.
As was explained in the beginning of the present section and supported with references to diff erent cases, aft er determining the material scope of a right, the Court assesses how the factual circumstances of the case fall within that scope. Leaving aside the absence of adequate legal analysis as to what human traffi cking is and accepting, for the sake of the argument, that human traffi cking does fall within the scope of Article 4, regardless of what the ECtHR's understanding of human traffi cking is, the Court did not explain how the factual circumstances of the case were related to human traffi cking. Instead, the ECtHR said the following:
In light of the proliferation of both traffi cking itself and of measures taken to combat it, the Court considers it appropriate in the present case to examine the extent to which traffi cking itself may be considered to run counter to the spirit and purpose of Article 4 of the Convention such as to fall within the scope of the guarantees off ered by that Article without the need to assess which of the three types of proscribed conduct are engaged by the particular treatment in the case in question. 35 […] In view of its obligation to interpret the Convention in light of present-day conditions, the Court considers it unnecessary to identify whether the treatment about which the applicant complains constitutes "slavery", "servitude" or " forced and compulsory labour". Instead, the Court concludes that traffi cking itself, within the meaning of Article 3(a) of the Palermo Protocol and Article 4(a) of the Anti-Traffi cking Convention, falls within the scope of Article 4 of the Convention (my emphasis). 36 Th ese pronouncements beg the following comments. If human traffi cking falls within Article 4, this means that not only slavery, servitude and forced labour, but 'exploitation' as the 'purpose' element of human traffi cking will be within the scope of Article 4 (as long as the other constitutive elements of human traffi cking are fulfi lled). Th us, it is not really necessary to defi ne the treatment only as slavery, servitude or forced labour. However, in accordance with the Palermo defi nition, the 'exploitation' as the purpose element of human traffi cking, has to be linked with certain 'actions' and certain 'means', so that human traffi cking is constituted. Eventually, what the Court might have done is expanding Article 4's material scope to cover 'exploitation'. However, this expansion will not cover 'exploitation' as such, but only exploitation which is linked with recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of coercion or deception. 37 Th is leads to the question why should 'exploitation' as a purpose element of human traffi cking be privileged over any type of 'exploitation'? Th ere is another source of confusion at this point; namely, the ECtHR referred to Rantseva as 'a victim of traffi cking or exploitation'. 38 Was she a victim of exploitation within the context of traffi cking, which requires linking the exploitation with certain 'means' and certain 'actions'? Alternatively, was she simply a victim of exploitation, which demands the question whether the material scope of Article 4 is enlarged to such an extent as to cover any 'exploitation'?
Th ere is another pertinent question as well: once having expanded the material scope of Article 4 to include 'exploitation', is it not necessary to explain what 'exploitation' actually is? It can be suggested that the ECtHR viewed such an explanation as superfl uous since the case was situated within the context of women working as prostitutes and the Court assumed that prostitution was inherently exploitative. 39 Th e adoption of this assumption precludes any analysis of the abuses themselves and the reasons for the abuses. Another concern caused by the adoption of this assumption in the judgment is that it is left uncertain how the situation of migrants working, for instance, in the agricultural or construction industries, jobs which are not claimed to be inherently exploitative, will be approached. It could be the case that if the Court is faced with abuses not reaching the threshold of forced labour, slavery or servitude, against migrant workers, these abuses might not be construed as being included in the material scope of Article 4. 40 Does the conclusion reached by the ECtHR that human traffi cking falls within Article 4 eliminate the need for making an assessment whether the factual circumstances of the case have anything to do with human traffi cking as defi ned in the Palermo Protocol? Do the 'proliferation of both traffi cking itself and of measures taken to combat it' and the 'obligation to interpret the Convention in light of presentday conditions' eliminate the need to assess whether the tragic story of Rantseva had 38 Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, at para. 296 (emphasis added).
39
Th e defi nition of human traffi cking as stipulated in the Palermo Protocol and then reproduced in the Council of Europe Convention on Traffi cking, leaves the position that prostitution in inherently exploitative as an available option. Th is is made possible through the incorporation of the phrase 'exploitation of the prostitution of others', which can be interpreted in diff erent ways. One possible interpretation is that any prostitution is exploitative. Th is ambiguity inherent in the defi nition of human traffi cking was necessary since at the time of the draft ing of the Palermo Protocol there were two opposing camps, which could not be reconciled: (1) one camp taking the stance that there was nothing wrong with voluntary prostitution and (2) another camp arguing that no prostitution is voluntary and any prostitution is exploitative. Th e formulation 'exploitation of the prostitution of others' with its ambiguous meaning, turned out to be an acceptable option for the both camps. At the same time, an interpretative note was added to the Travaux Préparatoires of the Palermo Protocol to the eff ect that 'Th e terms "exploitation of the prostitution of others" or "other forms of sexual exploitation" are not defi ned in the protocol, which is therefore without prejudice to how States parties address prostitution in their respective domestic laws'. Th e Explanatory Report to the Council of Europe Convention on Traffi cking (at para.88) contains a similar clarifi cation. Within the Council of Europe, diff erent states have diff erent approaches to prostitution. Th erefore, an argument that there is something close to a uniform standard as to how prostitution should be approached is precluded. On the draft ing history of the Palermo defi nition see Gallagher, op.cit., note 34, at p. 25; Doezema, J., Sex Slaves and Discourse Masters Th e Construction of Traffi cking, Zed Books, 2010, at p. 106-170. 40 On the thresholds of abuses covered by Article 4 of the ECHR, see Section 4 of this article.
Intersentia anything to do with human traffi cking? 41 It is suggested that underlying the whole analysis were the two above mentioned assumptions: since she entered Cyprus to work as an artistes, she worked as a prostitute; and, since she worked as a prostitute she was exploited, with the meaning of 'exploitation' being undetermined since the ECtHR never dared to explain it. As mentioned above, the question of what 'exploitation' means was viewed by the Court as superfl uous since prostitution seemed to be regarded as a practice which cannot be anything but exploitative.
DANCING ACROSS BORDERS
Once having exhausted the legal analysis by concluding that human traffi cking falls within Article 4 of the ECHR and assuming that the Rantsev case is one of human traffi cking, the ECtHR enumerated States' obligations under Article 4. Th ese obligations are altogether fi ve: (1) adopting criminal law measures to punish traffi ckers; (2) putting in place appropriate legal and administrative framework, which includes 'adequate measures regulating businesses oft en used as a cover for human traffi cking' and ensuring that 'a State's immigration rules […] address relevant concerns relating to encouragement, facilitation or tolerance of traffi cking'; 42 (3) taking of protective operational measures when it is demonstrated that 'the State authorities were aware, or ought to have been aware, of circumstances giving rise to a credible suspicion that an identifi ed individual has been, or was at real and immediate risk of being, traffi cked or exploited'; 43 (4) investigating situations of traffi cking; (5) cooperating in cross-border traffi cking cases with the relevant authorities of other States concerned. 44 Th e objective of this section of the article is to address the second obligation relating to States' immigration rules. Cyprus was found to be in violation of Article 4 since it failed to put in place an appropriate legislative and administrative framework to protect Rantseva from human traffi cking. Th e problem was the Cypriot immigration policy and, in particular, the artiste visa regime. Unfortunately, the Court did not off er an explanation on how the artiste visa regime was a factor in any ill-treatment or alleged abuse suff ered specifi cally by Rantseva under Article 4. Th e absence of such an explanation forms part of the problem identifi ed in the second section of the article, viz. absence of a meaningful investigation into how the factual circumstances of the particular case are related to Article 4. It can be speculated, based on the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights' reports, that as an artiste Rantseva was forced to work as a prostitute; however, she refused and her employer tried to have her deported since he wanted to bring in another artiste for his cabaret. Nevertheless, these are mere speculations and there are no facts pointing to such types of events. Even if the above described events did happen, this does not axiomatically mean that she was 'exploited' or subjected to servitude and slavery. What if she did agree to work as a prostitute, but she subsequently changed her mind? What if she came to Cyprus with the intention to work as a prostitute? 3.1. THE DANCING … Leaving the tragic story of Rantseva for a while, the focus will be directed on the artiste visa regime in Cyprus. Th e regime was, indeed, highly problematic. Th e regime incorporated certain conditions which made the artistes in Cyprus vulnerable to abuses. Th ese conditions include the following: the applications for entry, residence and work permit had to be submitted by the prospective employer; artistes' agents and cabaret managers were required to deposit money to cover possible repatriation expenses of the artistes; the work permit was valid for three months and was tied to a single employer; if the artiste did not show up for work she would be tracked down by her employer; and, in case of deportation, the expenses were to be covered by the deposited money. Th erefore, the 'dancing' under these conditions implied hardships, vulnerability and abuses. Th e correlation between the artiste visa regime conditions and the women's vulnerability has been explained within the Canadian context by Audrey Macklin in her article 'Dancing Across Borders: "Exotic Dancers," Traffi cking, and Canadian Immigration Policy'. Macklin commented that '[…] employment authorizations are temporary because the insecurity created by linking permission to remain in Canada with service to a particular employer or occupation ensures that workers tolerate wages and working conditions Canadians and permanent residents fi nd unacceptable'. 45 Th erefore, women's vulnerability was planned within the artiste regime itself. As it will emerge in the following section, specifi c objective was pursued by ensuring the artistes' vulnerability within the regime.
… AND THE BORDERS
Th e artiste visa regime conditions were incorporated with the objective of controlling the entry and residence of foreign nationals in Cyprus. Th e artiste visa's specifi c conditions pursued the objective to regulate the presence and stay of the artistes as foreign nationals in the territory of Cyprus. For instance, the conditions ensured that in case of termination of the employment when an artiste had no legal ground to be present any more, she could be traced down and deported. Th ey also ensured that the deportation did not constitute a fi nancial burden for the State. At the same time, as the ECtHR rightly pointed out, the artiste visa regime made artistes dependent on their employers. Th e ultimate conclusion is that migrants on a temporary work visa, Intersentia and in particular the artistes, had to be vulnerable so that their presence and stay within Cyprus could be easily controlled.
At this junction, there seems to be an irreconcilable confl ict: on the one hand, the particular visa regime conditions existed in service of a State's interest in controlling the entry and presence of aliens, and on the other hand, the conditions were such that made migrant artistes vulnerable to abuses. Th e position of the Council of Europe Commissioner on Human Rights, which was supported by the ECtHR, was in favor of elimination of the artiste visa regime altogether; the message seems to be that women should better stay in their home countries since if they migrate under the given conditions they run the risk of becoming prostitutes and being exploited. In fact, aft er the Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia judgment, Cyprus eliminated the artiste visa regime. 46 Th e following question, however, still remains: did the elimination of the regime eliminate the abuses? Th e more fundamental question is whether the elimination of a legal channel for immigration is the tool for eliminating abuses. A possible answer to the last question can be extracted from Macklin's article, where she says the following:
By prohibiting the lawful entry of foreign women employed in the sex trade, the state can avoid the embarrassment of propping up the exotic dancer market and play into an antiprostitution, law and order agenda, but only at the cost of consigning traffi cked women to the most unregulated market of all: the underground market.
[…] Th e denial of legal access to Canada does not actually prevent entry, and it is virtually impossible to know whether it even reduces it. One certain outcome is that it exacerbates the vulnerability of the women into intimidation, violence and exploitation by ruthless agents, pimps and brokers.
[…] Aft er all, if there is one group who is more vulnerable to exploitation than workers on temporary work visas, it is undocumented workers. 47 Macklin is not alone in her arguments. Th e Special Rapporteur on Violence against women has voiced identical concerns. 48 It should be also noted that Macklin does not comment on a decision by a human rights court. She simply comments on the Canadian immigration policy. In contrast to her, the present article comments on a judgment by the ECtHR, which appears to have implicated itself in an anti-immigration agenda without having much understanding of the broader issues pointed out by Macklin. In particular, the ECtHR made the following sweeping statement as part of States' general obligations under Article 4: 'Furthermore, a State's immigration rules must address relevant concerns relating to encouragement, facilitation or tolerance of traffi cking'. 49 In practice, this aspect of States' positive obligations means that the artiste visa as a legal channel for migration should be eliminated.
Why did the ECtHR become implicated into an anti-immigration and antiprostitution agenda? Th e following section proposes an answer to this question.
THE 'RISE' OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING AND THE MARGINALISATION OF SLAVERY, SERVITUDE AND FORCED LARBOUR IN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
Th e positive obligation of Cyprus to put in place an appropriate legislative and administrative framework to protect against abuses falling within the material scope of Article 4 was considered within the human traffi cking framework. What are the consequences fl owing from this way of construing the problem? As was elaborated upon in the fi rst section of the article, the actus reus of the crime of human traffi cking relates to the migration and the movement of individuals. Once construing the case within the human traffi cking framework, the problem is framed as one of immigration and controlling immigration. Th is resonates very adamantly in the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights' reports on which the ECtHR heavily relied: '[…] the number of young women migrating to Cyprus as nightclub artistes is well out of proportion to the population of the island and that the authorities should consider introducing preventive control measures to deal with this phenomenon […]'. 50 Once having construed the problem in this way, it stands to reason that the solution sought is preventing the possibility for migration, which implies elimination of the artiste visa regime. How could the problem be construed if the human traffi cking framework is discarded? How could the problem be construed if human traffi cking is not used as the overarching frame of reference? If the human traffi cking framework is discarded, the focus will be on the conditions of artistes and how the State-imposed regulations create susceptibilities to abuses. Th e focus will not be on the migration aspect and on whether women are engaged in prostitution; but on how to modify those regulations so that abuses by private parties are prevented. In summary, it is submitted that the Th e Court did pay attention to the State-imposed regulations and the problems that they caused; it did fi nd that the 'measures which encourage cabaret owners and managers to track down missing artistes' and the lodging of a bank guarantee to cover potential deportation costs, were troubling. 51 However, these considerations had predetermined meaning since they were already situated within the human traffi cking framework. Lamentably, the ECtHR did not take that road of examining the conditions on their own; it adopted the human traffi cking framework which led the Court to very contestable legal analysis and which resulted in anti-immigration and anti-prostitution implications.
Th e Court could have taken a very diff erent road; a road which stays away from the concept of human traffi cking. Th e Court could have devoted its resources to elaborate on the meaning of slavery, servitude and forced labour and to give these three practices progressive interpretation. Th e Court should have clarifi ed the scope and the thresholds of slavery, servitude and forced labour in Article 4 of the ECHR. Eventually, the ECtHR could have said that given the particular conditions within the artiste visa regime, the regulatory framework in Cyprus was of such a character that it did not provide for adequate safeguards against abuses. In this way, the underlying message will be a call for amendments within the regulatory framework; the message sent to Cyprus would be to change the visa regime so that the migrant artistes are independent from employers and have access to necessary protection and assistance facilities.
Th e legal analysis of the regulatory framework could include another element; namely, an element of vulnerability. Th is suggestion intends to shift the focus by emphasising the vulnerability associated with being a migrant worker.
Th e ECtHR has in its jurisprudence recognised certain groups as vulnerable. Such groups include children, 52 Roma minority, 53 ' In addition, if a restriction on fundamental rights applies to a particularly vulnerable group in society, who have suff ered considerable discrimination in the past, such as the mentally disabled, then the State's margin of appreciation is substantially narrower and it must have very weighty reasons for the restrictions in question. Th e reason for this approach, which questions certain classifi cations per se, is that such groups were historically subject to prejudice with lasting consequences, resulting in their social exclusion'. women subject to domestic violence, 55 and asylum-seekers. 56 Judge Sajo has tried to argue in his Partly Concurring and Partly Dissenting Opinion in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, that 'Th e concept of vulnerability has a specifi c meaning in the jurisprudence of the Court' and that a group is vulnerable only if it has been historically subject to prejudice with lasting consequences, resulting in social exclusion. 57 However, contrary to Judge Sajo's arguments, the Court has not established a strict criterion for defi ning a group as vulnerable. Th e Court has not conditioned 'vulnerability' based on historical prejudice with lasting consequences resulting in social exclusion. Th is is evidenced, for instance, from the Court's fi ndings that women subject to domestic violence and asylum-seekers are vulnerable groups. Th us, the ambit for fi nding vulnerability of various groups and due to various circumstances is open. It has been well documented that migrant workers, both documented and undocumented, are vulnerable categories in countries of destination. 58 Th erefore, it can be argued that the regulatory framework in Cyprus with regard to the artiste visa regime created a basis for further abuses and, in this way, exacerbated their vulnerability.
Before proceeding, the points made so far in this section will be summarised. Th e ECtHR was criticised for adopting a human traffi cking framework as a point of reference. It was suggested that the conditions within the artiste visa regime should be scrutinised on their own without any resort to the concept of human traffi cking. In addition, the conditions within the visa regime should be condemned as not providing suffi cient protection against abuses suff ered by a vulnerable group of people, namely migrant workers. 
M.S.S. v. Belgium and
Greece, at paras. 232, 233 and 252. 'In the present case the Court must take into account that the applicant, being an asylum seeker, was particularly vulnerable because of everything he had been through during his migration and the traumatic experiences he was likely to have endured previously'; 'In addition, the applicant's distress was accentuated by the vulnerability inherent in his situation as an asylum seeker'; 'Th e Court attaches considerable importance to the applicant's status as an asylum seeker and, as such, a member of a particularly underprivileged and vulnerable population group in need of special protection'. See also Party Concurring and Party Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sajo in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece. Judge Sajo argues that asylumseekers cannot be recognised as a 'particularly vulnerable group' because 'Th ey are not a group historically subject to prejudice with lasting consequences, resulting in their social exclusion. In fact, they are not socially classifi ed, and consequently treated, as a group'. 
Intersentia
To further buttress these arguments, an exploration of the relationship between, on the one hand, human traffi cking and, on the other hand, the practices of slavery, servitude and forced labour is necessary. Th is exploration is essential for substantiating the proposition that the human traffi cking framework could be discarded and instead the legal and factual analysis should be centered on the practices already prohibited by Article 4 of the ECHR. In what follows, it is also proposed how the Court should have engaged itself with the legal defi nition of slavery in relation to the factual circumstances in the Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia case.
SLAVERY -SERVITUDE -FORCED LABOUR -HUMAN TRAFFICKING (EXPLOITATION)
Article 4 of the ECHR contains a cluster of diff erent concepts. It introduces a fragmentation of abusive practices, namely, forced labour, servitude and slavery. A discussion on defi nitional problems related to each one of them and on the distinctions among them is pertinent because the defi nition of human traffi cking has introduced another concept, viz 'exploitation'. More specifi cally, there is an issue as to whether the threshold of 'exploitation' is lower than the thresholds of slavery, servitude and forced labour. 59 A meaningful legal debate on this issue is, however, impeded due to the lack of certainty as to the meaning of 'exploitation'. 60 In Siliadin v. France, the ECtHR developed a clear gradation among the abusive practices of slavery, servitude and forced labour. One can make an analogy with the gradation established in the jurisprudence of the Court regarding the prohibition on torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, with torture constituting the gravest abuse, inhuman treatment referring to a lesser level of severity and degrading treatment referring to the minimum level of severity to fall within the scope of Article 3. 65 Th e ECtHR qualifi ed Siliadin's situation as forced labour based on the defi nition of forced labour in the ILO Forced Labor Convention, which provides that 'all work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not off ered himself voluntarily'. 66 Th e Court said that 'the applicant was, at the least, subjected to forced labour within the meaning of Article 4 of the Convention at a time when she was a minor.' 67 Th e ECtHR then moved on to the concepts of slavery and servitude. Without initiating any legal analysis on the meaning of slavery as defi ned in the 1926 Slavery Convention, the Court simply concluded that Mr. and Mrs. B. did not exercise 'a genuine right of legal ownership over her, thus reducing her to the status of an 
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Intersentia
"object"'. 68 Although, Siliadin was not reduced to the status of an object, in the opinion of the Court, she was held in servitude. Th e ECtHR has defi ned servitude as 'an obligation to provide one's services that is imposed by the use of coercion, and is to be linked with the concept of "slavery"'. 69 Th e Court did not make it explicitly clear what actually the link between slavery and servitude was. However, it can be implied from the judgment that the reduction of somebody to the status of an object, which is slavery, is graver than servitude.
Th e ECtHR pointed to at least two distinguishing features of servitude as opposed to forced labour: (1) living on another person's property and (2) impossibility of altering his/her condition. 70 Th e judgment in Siliadin v. France indicates that a set of circumstances can be qualifi ed as both forced labour and servitude. However, the ECtHR still emphasised the distinguishing features of 'servitude' which allowed the situation to be assessed not only as forced labour, but also as servitude.
Despite this apparent gradation introduced in Siliadin v. France, there is still uncertainty. Th e source of the uncertainty is that the ECtHR did not ponder upon the meaning of 'powers attaching to the right of ownership'. 71 If slavery is interpreted as exercise of 'powers attaching to the right of ownership' as it is actually stipulated in the 1926 Slavery Convention, then the following questions arise: When are powers attaching to the right of ownership exercised, is it enough for a case to be qualifi ed as slavery', when an individual has become an object of purchase, exchange or transfer without involvement of physical abuses, and does the exercise of 'powers attaching to the right of ownership' always imply more severe abuses in contrast to forced labour? Th ese questions show that the human rights law is yet to develop so that the contours of the meaning of 'powers attaching to the right of ownership' become clearer. It is unfortunate that instead of going into a direction contributive to the abovementioned development, the focus has been concentrated on the concept of human traffi cking.
Th ere are examples of national courts which have tried to interpret the meaning of 'powers attaching to the right of ownership'. Th e decision by the High Court of Australia in the case of Th e Queen v. Tang 72 has been commended 'for providing the most far-reaching and cogent examination to date of the defi nition of "slavery" as established in international law'. 73 Although the legal analysis might be correct since the High Court of Australia defi ned slavery based on 'powers attaching to the right of ownership' (as opposed to the ECtHR, which defi nes slavery as requiring 'genuine 68 Siliadin v. France, at para. 122 (emphasis added).
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Siliadin v. France, at para. 123. When the Court examined the facts it pointed out that Siliadin 'had no means of living elsewhere than in the home of Mr. and Mrs. B' and that 'the applicant could not hope that her situation would improve …' at paras. 126 and 128. right of legal ownership'), the legal analysis and the fi nal conclusion in Th e Queen v. Tang have to be considered in combination with the factual circumstances.
Th e Queen v. Tang was a criminal case in which the accused was charged with the crime of slavery with regard to fi ve women of Th ai nationality. Th e women were used as sex workers in a brothel. Th ey came voluntary to Australia to work as sex workers upon the understanding that once they had paid off their debt, they would have the opportunity to earn money on their own account as prostitutes. Th ey were escorted during their fl ight and upon arrival were treated as being 'owned' by those who procured their passage. Th e amount of their debt was set at $45 000. Th is debt had to be worked off at the rate of $50 per customer. Th ey earned nothing in cash while under the contract with the exception that they had one free day per week during which they could keep the $50 per customer. Th e women were well-provisioned, fed, and provided for. Th ey were not kept under lock and key. However, it was concluded that in the totality of the circumstances, 'the complainants were eff ectively restricted to the premises'. 74 Aft er paying off their debt, the restrictions on the women were to be lift ed, their passports returned and they were free to choose their hours of work, and their accommodation.
Th e above described set of circumstances was qualifi ed as slavery by the High Court of Australia. Aft er establishing that the defi nition of slavery should be based on Article 1 of the 1926 Slavery Convention and in particular 'powers attaching to the right of ownership' which covers a de facto condition of slavery, 75 Gleeson CJ concluded for the majority that:
In this case, the critical powers the exercise of which was disclosed (or the exercise of which a jury reasonably might have disclosed) by the evidence were the power to make the complainants an object of purchase, the capacity, for the duration of the contracts, to use the complainants and their labor in a substantially unrestricted manner, the power to control and restrict their movements, and the power to use their services without commensurate compensation. 76 If 'slavery' is to be reserved for truly grave forms of abuses, the facts in Queen v. Tang do not really point into that direction. 77 Despite these obstacles related to the distinctions between the three practices in Article 4 of the ECHR, one might argue that 'exploitation' is a form of abuse of a lower threshold as opposed to slavery, servitude and forced labour. 78 is pursued, then the concept of human traffi cking could be necessary since it could encompass lesser forms of harm. Th is claim is without prejudice to the statement previously made in the article as to the lack of understanding concerning what 'exploitation' actually is. Th e insecurity as to the meaning of 'exploitation' which is a central element in the defi nition of human traffi cking continues to be a valid and relevant consideration. However, the objective at this stage is to examine the relationship between the three practices prohibited in Article 4 of the ECHR and human traffi cking as defi ned in the Palermo Protocol.
As already mentioned, the action element of human traffi cking as defi ned in the Palermo Protocol is not 'exploitation' as such. With the Traffi cking Protocol, States do not adopt an obligation to criminalise 'exploitation', but the 'recruitment, transportation, transfer or receipt of persons' by certain means 'for the purpose of exploitation'. A logical conclusion from this line of thought could be that there is no overlap between 'human traffi cking' and the three abusive practices prohibited by Article 4 of the ECHR. Th e practices in Article 4 prohibit the actual abuses, while human traffi cking prohibits the movement by certain means for the purpose of 'exploitation'. Th e problem, however, that slavery, servitude and forced labour under Article 4 might be too demanding in terms of the level of abuses required to meet the necessary thresholds, is still present. Th is is not an unsolvable problem, though.
PROGRESSIVE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 4
To support the assertion that that slavery, servitude and forced labour do not set too exacting standards rendering Article 4 of the ECHR non-operational, the following three points deserve consideration.
First, the steps which the ECtHR undertook in Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia in order to fi nally conclude in the judgment that 'traffi cking itself within the meaning of Article 3(a) of the Palermo Protocol and Article 4(a) of the Anti-traffi cking Convention, falls within the scope of Article 4 of the Convention' have to be reviewed. 79 Th e ECtHR resorted to the principle that the rights in the ECHR had to be interpreted and applied 'so as to make its safeguards practical and eff ective'. 80 It further noted that ' […] in assessing the scope of Article 4 of the Convention, sight should not be lost of the Convention's special features or of the fact that it is a living instrument which must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions. Th e increasingly high standards required in the area of the protection of human rights and fundamental liberties correspondingly and inevitably require greater fi rmness in assessing breaches of the fundamental values of democratic societies. 84 If the Court can use the above-mentioned means of progressive interpretation to conclude that Article 4 covers human traffi cking, then why should the Court not use the same means to decide that Article 4 covers lesser forms of abuses than the potentially high standards established with the concepts of slavery, servitude and forced labour? A progressive interpretation of Article 4 of the ECHR could bring the ECtHR to the conclusion that Article 4's material scope encompasses a certain minimum level of severity. Th e concept of human traffi cking and the defi nition of human traffi cking are redundant for reaching the above conclusion. Th e Court did not have to go through the concept of human traffi cking in order to expand the material scope of Article 4.
An alternative road which the ECtHR could have possibly taken is using the means for evolutive interpretation of the Convention in order to interpret forced labour, slavery and servitude more expansively so that these three harmful practices are 'interpreted in light of the present day conditions' and in light of 'the increasingly high standards required in the area of the protection of human rights and fundamental liberties'. At this point, the proposal elaborated above and related to the special vulnerability of migrant workers could be useful. Th is road will, however, imply that the Court has to revisit its restrictive interpretation of slavery as requiring legal ownership. Th e reconsideration of the scope of slavery should not be that diffi cult since the defi nition of slavery in the 1926 Slavery Convention does not exact legal ownership.
In order to elaborate on the third point, a reproduction of the most prominent ECtHR's pronouncement in Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia is necessary:
[…] traffi cking in human beings, by its very nature and aim of exploitation, is based on the exercise of powers attaching to the right of ownership. It treats human beings as commodities to be bought and sold and put to forced labor, oft en for little or no payment, usually in the sex industry but also elsewhere. 85 As was already commented on, the determination that traffi cking in human beings is 'based on the exercise of powers attaching to the right of ownership' is not correct. Traffi cking has a specifi c defi nition in international law and it is the defi nition of slavery which reads that slavery is an 'exercise of powers attaching to the right of ownership'. At this junction, the following question arises: accepting the ECtHR's determination in the above quote at face value, was there any need for the concept of human traffi cking, when, in fact, international law and human rights law already have a concept covering abuses against human beings defi ned as an 'exercise of powers attaching to the right of ownership'? Why should the Court go through the concept of human traffi cking in order to determine that 'exercise of powers attaching to the right of ownership' is an abuse within the material scope of Article 4? Th e Court already has in its legal toolbox the concept of slavery. All it has to do is analyse the defi nition of slavery and explain whether and how the abuses in the particular case manifest an exercise of powers attaching to the right of ownership.
Th ere is, however, one very welcoming result from the pronouncement quoted in the beginning of the previous paragraph. Th e ECtHR, without open recognition, revisited its previous position that 'exercise of powers attaching to the right of ownership' means exercise of 'a genuine right of legal ownership'. As explained before, in Siliadin v. France, the ECtHR ruled that no powers attaching to the right of ownership were exercised with regard to Siliadin since the story of the girl did not show that Mr. and Mrs. B 'exercised a genuine right of legal ownership over her, thus reducing her to the status of an object.' In Rantzev v. Cyprus and Russia, the Court dropped the requirement for legal ownership and gave the following explanation as to when powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised: treating 'human beings as commodities to be bought and sold and put to forced labour, oft en for little or no payment, usually in the sex industry but also elsewhere.' 86 Despite this welcoming development, the ECtHR did not undertake an inquiry into how powers attaching to the right of ownership were exercised with regard to Rantseva. In the following section of the article, a suggestion is off ered as to how the Court could have made this inquiry.
In conclusion, the ECtHR should not have marginalised the concepts of slavery, servitude and forced labour. Th ey off er the necessary potential for addressing the need for eff ective protection of human rights. Th e ECtHR should not have contributed to the 'rise' of the concept of human traffi cking, which is anyway uncertain and problematic and which leads to negative externalities.
LEGAL ENGAGEMENT WITH THE DEFINITION OF SLAVERY
In the sections above, arguments concerning generally to the material scope of Article 4 were advanced. Th e next stage of the article is giving hints to the Court as to how it could have actually engaged and worked with the defi nition of slavery as exercise of powers attaching to the right of ownership, in relation to the particular facts in Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia. Th is stage proceeds on the premise that slavery is not legal ownership since the law does not allow one human being to own another human being.
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Before immersing again into the factual circumstances in Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, it is necessary to clarify that there are not many sources which could be of assistance for elucidating when powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised and what the indicators of such powers are. A report by the UN Secretary General from 1953 lists some characteristics: making an individual an object of purchase; using the individual's capacity to work in an absolute manner; making the products of the individual's labour property of the master without any compensation commensurable to the value of the labour, and lack of possibility for terminating the situation by the will of the individual. 87 Another relevant source is the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia's (ICTY) Trial Chamber's 88 and Appeals Chamber's 89 judgments in Kunarac et al., where the ICTY elaborated on the meaning of enslavement under the ICTY's Statute. Th e ICTY Appeals Chamber identifi ed indicia of enslavement. It pointed to 'control of someone's movement, control of physical environment, psychological control, measures taken to prevent or deter escape, force, threat of force or coercion, duration, assertion of exclusivity, subjection to cruel treatment and abuse, control of sexuality and forced labour'. 90 As already mentioned, the High Court of Australia has engaged with the defi nition of slavery and has also identifi ed the indicia. It referred to […] power to make the complainants an object of purchase, the capacity, for the duration of the contracts, to use the complainants and their labor in a substantially unrestricted manner, the power to control and restrict their movements, and the power to use their services without commensurate compensation. Henceforth, the objective is introducing and elaborating on suggestions on how the ECtHR could have utilised the defi nition of slavery in Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia. Th e focus has to be fi rst guided on the conditions within the artiste visa regime and in particular the requirement for a bank deposit. Artiste agents were required to deposit a bank letter guarantee in the sum of 15.000 CYP (approximately 25.000 EUR) to cover possible repatriation expenses. Cabaret managers were required to deposit a bank warranty in the sum of from 2.500 CYP to 10.000 CYP (approximately from 4.200 EUR to 17.000 EUR) to cover a repatriation for which the manager was responsible. 96 Th e requirement for a bank deposit presented itself as a transaction. Th e parties within the transaction were, on the one hand, the State and, on the other hand, the cabaret agents and managers. Th e cabaret agents and managers deposited a substantial amount of money to the State so that in case of deportation the State could cover its expenses. Th e object of that transaction was ultimately the artiste; she did not have any say in this transaction; she could not 'negotiate' her place within the relation between the State and the cabaret owners. Th e bank deposit should be considered in combination with the consequences fl owing from it. In particular, the agents and the managers were aware that if an artiste was deported they would 94 Article 7(2)(c) of the Rome Statute. Th e whole defi nition of enslavement is 'exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over a person and includes the exercise of such power in the course of traffi cking in persons, in particular women and children'. Th e second half of the defi nition refers to 'traffi cking'. However, it is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the meaning of 'traffi cking' in the Rome Statute. lose the deposit. Because of the deposit, the managers behaved as if they 'owned' the artistes. Accordingly, the whole scheme could be viewed as a transaction since the cabaret managers paid money to the State so that the State allowed them to have artistes working for them. Th e amount of the deposit was also of some signifi cance. Th e deposit constituted a substantial amount of money which could not be justifi ed based on potential administrative costs incurred by the State.
Th is transaction played out under the legitimacy of the law. Apparently, there was no issue of legal ownership since the law did not sanction actual ownership of the artistes by the agents and managers. However, the legal requirement for a bank deposit made the exercise of powers attaching to the right of ownership possible.
Th e collusion between the State and the cabaret managers did not end here. Th e policemen, as agents of the State, behaved as if Rantseva was under the cabaret manager's custody and he was the authority to be approached in matters regarding her. Th is is evidenced by the facts that the policemen called the manager and they witnessed the action of him picking her up from the police station.
Besides the bank deposit, a relevant factor when making an assessment as to whether powers attaching to the right of ownership were exercised in regard to Rantseva, was the displacement and in general terms her placement in the space and on the territory. As mentioned in the previous section, the Court has distinguished as one of the relevant factors in the assessment whether a situation can be defi ned as servitude whether the individual has to live on the employer's premises. 97 Living on the employer's premises presupposes some form of territorialising the person. In a similar fashion, the placement of the person in the space and on the territory should be a pertinent consideration in the examination whether the situation can be qualifi ed as slavery. Th us, the relocation of Rantseva from the police department to the private fl at is of legal relevance. Her placement and confi nement in the apartment is equally pertinent. When these two events are considered in conjunction with the bank deposit, the result is that the manager had 'bought' the privilege to territorialise 'his' artiste.
Th e Court should be urged to initiate such legal analysis so that it contributes to the understanding of the meaning and parameters of Article 4. Instead of going into the human traffi cking issue, the ECtHR should have made use of what Article 4 already has to off er. Arguably, the conceptualization of the facts in Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia based on the slavery argument, as demonstrated above, foregrounds Cyprus' involvement in the abuses. In contrast, the traffi cking argument makes Cyprus less complicit in Rantseva's fate. 98 If the slavery argument is pursued, then the bank deposit required by the Cypriot legislation comes very much into the spotlight. If the slavery argument is pursued, the fact that the public authorities handed Rantseva over to the manager is also strongly spotlighted. As opposed to the slavery argument, the traffi cking argument highlights the issues of prostitution, the allegedly inherently exploitative nature of prostitution and the immigration of 'poor' Easter European women.
5.
VICTIMS TO BE SAVED?
Cyprus was also found in violation of Article 4 since the authorities failed to take protective operational measures to remove Rantseva from the harm of human traffi cking. 99 Th e legal analysis related to protective operational measures, is introduced with the statement that Th ere can therefore be no doubt that the Cypriot authorities were aware that a substantial number of foreign women, particularly from the ex-USSR, were being traffi cked to Cyprus on artistes visas and, upon arrival, were being sexually exploited by cabaret owners and managers. 100 Th is general background of the situation, as reported by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, plays a paramount role in the Court drawing the following conclusion:
In 105 Th is was a domestic violence case, in which a husband assaulted his wife and her mother and eventually killed the mother. Aft er reiterating the test established in Osman v. the United Kingdom, the ECtHR emphasised that when deciding the case it will take account of the general problem of domestic violence in Turkey as reported from various sources. Th e Court stressed that the issue of domestic violence 'cannot be confi ned to the circumstances of the present case' and accordingly, it 'will bear in mind the gravity of the problem at issue when examining the present case'. 106 Th e Court reviewed the history of assaults against the two women and the reaction by the authorities; it concluded that the authorities not only knew but could have foreseen a lethal attack. 107 Accordingly, the fi rst prong of the Osman test was fulfi lled. Th e ECtHR proceeded with the second prong of the test, namely the due diligence element. Th e women fi led complaints but had to withdraw them due to threats and pressure exerted on them. Pursuant to the Turkish legislation at the material time, if the victim withdrew her complaint, the prosecutor could no longer bring criminal proceedings against the abuser. 108 Th us, the crucial issue in Opuz v. Turkey was 'whether the local authorities displayed due diligence to prevent violence against the applicant and her mother, in particular by pursuing criminal or other appropriate preventive measures against H.O despite the withdrawal of complaints by the victims'. 109 Turkey was found in failure of its positive obligation to protect the right to life since it did not display due diligence. What is of signifi cance for the purposes of the present analysis is that to reach its conclusion the ECtHR relied on accounts of the general problem of domestic violence in Turkey. Nevertheless, this reliance did not preclude scrutiny as to the agency of the women to make the authorities aware of their dire situation.
Th ree steps can be distinguished in the ECtHR's analysis on protective operational measures in Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia. Th e fi rst step is referral to reports which gave general information about the 'fl ourishing' of traffi cking in Cyprus, the connection between the 'fl ourishing' and the artiste visa regime and that many of the artistes were from the former USSR. Th e second step is noting that Rantseva was an artiste in Cyprus from a Russian nationality who was taken by her employer from the police station. Th e third step is reminding States of their obligations under the Traffi cking Protocol to 'strengthen training for law enforcement, immigration and other relevant offi cials in the prevention of traffi cking in persons'. 110 In the opinion of the Court, the above mentioned indicators were enough to make the authorities aware of circumstances 'giving rise to a credible suspicion that Ms Rantseva was, or was at real and immediate risk of being, a victim of traffi cking or exploitation'. 111 In comparison with the standards and the level of scrutiny adopted by the Court in the previously mentioned cases, there are signifi cant deviations in the Rantsev case. First, in Opuz v. Turkey, the gravity of the general problem of domestic violence was taken into account and the particular case was put within the context of that gravity. However, this contextual approach still did not preclude the Court from reviewing all the incidents of violence and complaints fi led by the women, which gave the foundations for establishing whether the authorities could have foreseen the lethal attack and have acted with due diligence. Since such a review is lacking in Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, one can infer that 'against the general backdrop of traffi cking issues in Cyprus' any foreign woman in Cyprus who is on an artiste visa and comes from Eastern Europe can be presumed to be a victim of traffi cking and exploitation when the police happen to be in contact with her.
Second, the test established in Osman v. the United Kingdom and subsequently applied by the Court in other cases, 112 has been modifi ed in Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia to the eff ect that a new element is added which makes the test less demanding. Th e new element is 'circumstances giving rise to a credible suspicion'. 113 It is not of domestic violence when the victim withdraws her complaint. However, the possibility for continuation of prosecution in the public interest despite withdrawal should be available. See Opuz v. Turkey, at paras. 138 and 139. 110 required that the applicants show that the authorities knew or ought to have known of the existence of a real and immediate risk; under the Rantsev test, it has to be established that the authorities knew or ought to have known of 'circumstances giving rise to a credible suspicion' of a real and immediate risk.
Th e Court does not explain where the standard of 'credible suspicion' comes from. Neither does it give any hints as to why exactly this standard was endorsed. To answer these questions which were left open by the ECtHR, an analogy with the procedural mechanism introduced with Article 10(2) of the Council of Europe Traffi cking Convention is possible. Article 10(2) stipulates that […] if the competent authorities have reasonable grounds to believe that a person has been victim of human traffi cking, that person shall not be removed from its territory until the identifi cation process as a victim of an off ence provided for in Article 18 of this Convention [the off ence of human traffi cking] has been completed (emphasis added).
In addition, the Council of Europe Convention ensures a minimum level of assistance to those individuals for whom there are reasonable ground to believe that they are victims. Th us, the Council of Europe Convention guarantees temporal non-removal and provision of minimum social assistance to presumed victims. Th e introduction of the standard of 'reasonable grounds to believe' in the Council of Europe Convention is regarded as necessary since it is reported that victims do not actually perceive themselves as victims 114 and that 'national authorities are oft en insuffi ciently aware of the problem of traffi cking in human beings.' 115 By analogy, the ECtHR in Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia might have had to 'soft en' the Osman test on protective operational measures by establishing that it is suffi cient if the authorities knew or ought to have known of 'circumstances giving rise to a credible suspicion' of a real and immediate risk. However, the less demanding Rantsev test raises some questions.
It would have been benefi cial if the ECtHR had substantiated and explained the modifi cation of the Osman test. In the Rantsev judgment, the Court introduced the test applicable when making an assessment whether the State authorities had fulfi lled their positive obligations to take protective operation measures under Article 4. 116 In the same paragraph, the Court also referred to Osman v. the United Kingdom and to Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey. 117 However, the Court did not explain why the test should be diff erent with regard to traffi cked persons. Is it because they are foreign nationals who are reluctant to approach the State authorities for assistance? Is it because migrants who suff er abuses do not regard themselves as victims? Is it because of some specifi c vulnerabilities which justify greater vigilance on behalf of the authorities? Is it because 114 Rantsev v. Cyprus women who are supposedly prostitutes need a higher level of protection? Is it because foreign women who are supposedly prostitutes need a higher level of protection? Th ere are further questions that are left uncatered for. Is the less stringent Rantsev test of relevance only to persons who are allegedly victims of human traffi cking for the purpose of prostitution? Are States' positive obligations to protect migrants, both regular and irregular, against abuses falling within the material scope of Article 4, going to be tested under the same standard? In light of the weak legal analysis behind the test, the test is questionable. Is the Rantsev test applicable only with regard to foreign prostitutes who have to be saved, irrespective of whether they want to be saved or whether there is something to be saved from?
CONCLUSION: DANCING ON THE BORDERS OF ARTICLE 4
In Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, the ECtHR took on board the Palermo defi nition of human traffi cking without actually explaining its elements and how they related to the particular factual circumstances. Once having started a 'dance' with the human traffi cking argument, the Court performed on an anti-prostitution and antiimmigration stage. Th e ECtHR should not have resorted to the human traffi cking framework. Instead, it should have focused on the abusive practices covered by Article 4 of the ECHR. Th is article suggested how the material scope of Article 4 could be interpreted 'in light of the present day conditions' and in light of 'the increasingly high standards required in the area of the protection of human rights and fundamental liberties'. Arguments were developed on how the facts in Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia indicate that powers attaching to the right of ownership could have been exercised. More specifi cally, at least two factors indicate that powers attaching to the right of ownership could have been exercised with regard to Rantseva: (1) the bank deposit which presents itself as a transaction and (2) the displacement of Rantseva in the space. Finally, although, it is commendable that the Court found that States have positive obligations to take protective operational measures, the legal analysis relating to protective operational measures in the Rantsev case is far from persuasive and leaves many questions unanswered.
